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I. INTRODUCTION: BRETTON WOODS 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE U.S. LEGACY 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and its predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) of 1947,1 were 
established to promote peace by putting a break on beggar-thy-
neighbor protectionist policies, believed to have largely contributed 
to global economic depression and the rise of Adolf Hitler and 
fascism in Europe.2 At the conference that led to their creation at 
 
 *  Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. An 
earlier version of this article was written for and delivered at a symposium titled 
“International Trade and Sustainable Development,” held at Sungkyunkwan 
University College of Law, Seoul, South Korea, on October 9, 2010. This 
undertaking was made possible through a grant from the Brain Korea 21 project. 
The author wishes to thank her research assistant as well as Yujin Kim and 
Alexander Xenopoulos for their assistance in preparing this article for submission. 
 1.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187.  
 2. See James M. Boughton, The Role of the IMF in Peace and Security, 20 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1117, 1117-22 (2005), reprinted in TRADE AS GUARANTOR 
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Bretton Woods, the Allied nations recognized that great differences 
in wealth between nations and peoples were not conducive to world 
peace. The architects of the post–World War II economic system, 
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, hoped that the 
Bretton Woods institutions would be a bulwark against protectionism 
and assist countries during economic hardship, while rebuilding war-
torn Europe and Japan.3 
Ironically, with the decline of U.S. power, the influence of 
principles long championed by the United States, such as 
transparency, accountability, participation, and promotion of the rule 
of law, is on the rise. These “good governance” criteria (or at least 
the rhetoric surrounding them) have been adopted by nations and by 
international organizations and civil society groups.4 For example, 
the WTO promotes a U.S.-inspired vision of the regulatory state, 
emphasizing domestic transparency and predictability in the 
administration or application of trade-related measures (an ever-
expanding category) and privileging procedure for its legitimation of 
 
OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?—CRITICAL, EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 6 (Padideh Ala’i et al. eds., 2006) (highlighting the existence of a 
link between global free trade and peace and prosperity); Julio A. Lacarte, The 
Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in Securing the Peace, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REV. 1127, 1127-32, reprinted in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY?—CRITICAL, EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 1 
(explaining that the GATT carried out trade liberalization rounds in response to 
post–World War II protectionist measures that curtailed international commerce). 
 3. See Boughton, supra note 2, at 1118-22 (arguing that the idea of an 
interconnection between free trade and peace and prosperity influenced Keynes’s 
and White’s work even before Bretton Woods in 1944). Importantly, the post–
World War II economic order was built on an economic/non-economic distinction. 
Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund states 
that the purposes of the IMF are, among other things, to “provide[] . . . consultation 
and collaboration on international monetary problems,” to “promot[e] and 
maint[ain] high levels of employment and real income[,] and to . . . develop[] . . . 
the productive resources of all members.” See Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, art. I(i)-(ii), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 
39. Article IV, on the other hand, states that the IMF, in fulfilling its surveillance 
duties, “shall [respect] . . . the domestic social [and] political policies of the 
members.” Id. art. IV(5)(f). 
 4. See generally What is Good Governance?, U.N. ECON. & SOC. COMM’N 
FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/ 
Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (defining “good 
governance” so as to include eight basic characteristics: “It is participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive[,] and follows the rule of law.”). 
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substance or end results despite their unpopularity.5 The WTO 
dispute settlement system has also gravitated towards U.S.-style 
litigation, as WTO members who have traditionally shied away from 
airing their grievances through litigation (for example, China) 
increasingly resort to litigation to resolve their concerns. In addition, 
the WTO Appellate Body conducts U.S.-style legal analysis, 
applying balancing tests to evaluate, on a fact-specific basis, 
competing policy objectives and public interests while emphasizing 
the need for consistency and predictability.  
It is against this backdrop that this work discusses the creation, 
evolution, and future of the WTO and its role in promoting 
“sustainable development.”6 First, it explores the evolving mandate 
of the WTO. Then, it examines the evolution of GATT Article X 
(“Publication and Regulation of Trade Administration”). Third, it 
analyzes the evolution of GATT Article XX (“General Exceptions”). 
Finally, it concludes with some thoughts about what this evolution 
has meant and should mean for the future of the WTO.  
 
 5. See William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational 
Choice Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1082 (1999), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=1027611 (defining “transparency” as “the provision of access to 
official information for social, political, and economic functioning,” or “a measure 
of the degree to which information about official activity is made available to an 
interested party”); cf. Press Release, WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Structural 
Problems Are Inhibiting Development, PRESS/TPRB/309 (Apr. 22, 2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp309_e.htm (reporting that structural 
problems, such as diminished transparency and predictability, hinder the 
development of business and competitiveness in Mozambique). 
 6. See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev. 
(Brundtland Comm’n), Our Common Future: Rep. of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in Accordance with Paragraph 10 of General 
Assembly Resolution 38/161 (1983), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, 
ch. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, Annex (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter Brundtland 
Report], available at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm (defining 
“sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”). 
The term embodies “two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the 
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; 
and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.” Id. 
1012 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
II. EXPANSION OF THE WTO MANDATE  
From 1947 to 1995, the GATT’s mandate was limited to two 
goals: market access and non-discrimination.7 At first, this was a 
relatively simple task because the GATT was concerned primarily 
with the reduction of tariffs. Over time, the rise of the regulatory 
state resulted in the proliferation of non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”), 
such as health and safety requirements and environmental 
regulations. Thus, despite significant reduction, tariffs were 
eventually replaced by NTBs, creating new challenges for the global 
trading system.  
GATT Contracting Parties recognized the limits of free trade, and 
this recognition is most visible in Article XX, the general exceptions 
to the GATT. Article XX acknowledged that, in some exceptional 
cases, other important policy objectives, such as human health, could 
(and should) trump the goal of free trade through liberalization of 
markets and application of non-discrimination principles.8 GATT 
panels, however, did not engage in the process of weighing and 
balancing non-trade interests with trade interests. As a result, no 
Contracting Party invoked Article XX in successful defense of a 
trade barrier.9  
GATT panels and Contracting Parties also marginalized Article X 
(“Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”).10 The 
 
 7. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (encouraging member states to “enter[] 
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” that “substantial[ly] 
reduc[e] tariffs and other barriers to trade and . . . eliminat[e] . . . discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce”). Achievement of these goals would meet the 
ultimate objectives of “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a 
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
developing the full use of the resources of the world[,] and expanding the 
production and exchange of goods . . . .” Id. 
 8. See id. art. XX (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . necessary to 
protect human, animal, or plant life or health . . . .”). 
 9. Cf. Padideh Ala’i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of 
the WTO Appellate Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade 
Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1129, 1130-71 (1999) (analyzing the 
recent Article XX jurisprudence in which the Appellate Body has not 
automatically upheld the free trade goals of GATT over any other objective, 
including public health, sustainable development, or the environment). 
 10. See generally Padideh Ala’i, From the Periphery to the Center? The 
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rationale behind this marginalization was the relatively narrow 
mandate of the GATT 1947—that is, all barriers to trade in goods 
must be removed or applied in a non-discriminatory manner. GATT 
panels, in adherence to a substance-procedure distinction, deemed 
Article X (a procedural provision) to be far less important than the 
other, substantive provisions of the GATT. Their reasoning generally 
was as follows: A challenged measure is first assessed for its 
consistency with one or more of the “substantive” provisions of the 
GATT—for example, the MFN obligation under Article I, the 
“national treatment” requirement under Article III, or the prohibition 
of quantitative restrictions under Article XI. If the measure is found 
to be inconsistent with any of those “substantive” provisions, as 
many invariably were, the process, procedures, or regulations by 
which that measure is administered becomes a subsidiary issue. In 
other words, if a measure is “substantively” inconsistent with the 
obligations of the Contracting Parties, the publication of the measure 
or whether it is applied in an “impartial, uniform and reasonable 
manner” is irrelevant.11  
 
Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good Governance, 11 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 779 (2008), reprinted in REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 165 (Debra P. Steger ed., 2009), 
available at http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/40859/1/128972.pdf 
(contrasting GATT panels’ recognition of Article X as “‘subsidiary’ to other, 
‘substantive’ provisions of the GATT and the WTO view of Article X to include 
fundamentally important obligations, such as transparency and due process). 
Article X was mentioned in only nine adopted GATT 1947 panel decisions. Id. at 
783. Among these decisions, only two—Canada—Provincial Liquor Boards (U.S.) 
and European Economic Community—Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples—
discuss Article X in detail. See id. at 786; see also Report of the Panel, Canada—
Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing 
Agencies, DS17/R (Oct. 16, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27 (1992); 
Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Restrictions on Imports of 
Dessert Apples—Complaint by Chile, L/6491 (Apr. 18, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(36th Supp.) at 93 (1990). In the remaining cases, the panels dismissed the Article 
X claims as subsidiary issues that did not need to be addressed. See Ala’i, supra, at 
786. 
 11. GATT art. X:3. For instance, in Japan—Leather II (U.S.), the panel did not 
examine the Article X claim because the measure had already been found to 
violate Article XI. See Report of the Panel, Panel on Japanese Measures on 
Imports of Leather, ¶¶ 56-57, L/5623 (Mar. 2, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) 
at 94 (1985) [hereinafter Japan—Leather II] (finding Japanese arguments 
insufficient to “rebut the presumption that the quantitative restrictions on imports 
of leather had nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States under 
Article XI [as well as under Articles II and XIII:3] of the General Agreement”). 
 1014 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
The creation of the WTO in 1995 brought GATT Article X (and 
other procedural provisions) as well as GATT Article XX to the 
forefront of WTO jurisprudence. The provisions of the WTO 
Agreements reflect the reality of the regulatory state and, with it, a 
recognition that certain categories of regulation, such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations or technical regulations or standards, are 
legitimate despite their impact on trade. Therefore, in the past two 
decades, the focus of WTO panels and the Appellate Body has 
shifted from harmonization and mutual recognition to transparent 
application and administration.  
In 1994, the preamble of the GATT was amended to reflect current 
environmental concerns and post–World War II changes in the trade 
landscape. As a result, today the preamble of the WTO Agreement 
also includes the following italicized language:  
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade 
in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development.12 
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of GATT Article XX reflects 
 
Similarly, in Japan—Agricultural Products I, the panel found the Japanese 
measure to be in violation of Article XI:1 and thus did not rule on the Article X 
claim. See Report of the Panel, Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products, ¶ 5.4.2, L/6523 (Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th 
Supp.) at 163 (1988) [hereinafter Japan—Agricultural Products] (foregoing a 
finding on the quantitative restrictions because “the United States had, as a 
subsidiary matter, argued that Japan had also nullified or impaired benefits under 
Articles X:1, X:3 and XIII:3”). Once more, the panel in Japan—Semi-Conductors 
declined to rule on the Article X claim but impliedly acknowledged the 
transparency issue that existed with the Japanese system of “administrative 
guidance,” stating that the system “was a traditional tool of Japanese government 
policy based on consensus and peer pressure.” See Report of the Panel, Japan—
Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 107, L/6309 (Mar. 24, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th 
Supp.) at 116 (1989) [hereinafter Japan—Semi-Conductors]. 
 12. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (emphasis 
added). 
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this amendment and is thus consistent with the requirements of 
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.13 In U.S.—
Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that the scope of Article XX has 
changed given the new preambular language referencing the 
“objective of sustainable development.”14 Specifically, it noted that 
the change to the GATT 1947 preamble, which originally had been 
used as a “template for the preamble of the new WTO Agreement,” 
clearly qualified the original objectives of the GATT 1947.15 The 
Appellate Body continued: 
We note once more that this language demonstrates recognition by WTO 
negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this 
preambular language reflects the intentions of the negotiators of the WTO 
Agreement, we believe it must add color, texture and shading to our 
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this 
case, the GATT 1994.16 
In other words, the goal of the multilateral trading system can no 
longer be seen simply as market liberalization and non-
discrimination.17 The preamble indicates that there is also a 
“development” goal. However, whether the goal of “sustainable 
development” supersedes the other, traditional goals of the trading 
system is unclear.18 The impact of the preambular language, if any, 
 
 13. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 
U.S.—Shrimp] (“The Panel did not follow all of the steps [required by Article 3.2 
of the DSU when] . . . applying the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.’”). 
 14. See id. ¶ 129 (noting that the “preamble of the WTO Agreement—which 
informs not only the GATT 1994, but also the other covered agreements—
explicitly acknowledges ‘the objective of sustainable development’”). 
 15. See id. ¶ 152 (recognizing that the “full use of the resources of the world,” 
an objective included in the preamble of GATT 1947, was not suitable for the 
multilateral trading system of the 1990s). 
 16. Id. ¶ 153. 
 17. See id. ¶ 152 (implying that because the amended language references 
“different levels of economic development,” the preamble, as amended, also takes 
into account in interpreting the obligations contained therein the principle of 
special and differential treatment for less developed countries). 
 18. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development states that the 
pillars of sustainable development are “economic development, social 
development and environmental protection at the local, national, regional and 
 1016 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
on the “substantive” provisions of the WTO such as Article I (MFN), 
Article III (national treatment), Article XI (elimination of quotas and 
other non-tariff barriers), as well as the provisions of the other Annex 
1A Agreements or other obligations (such as those contained in 
protocols of accession or working party reports) is also unclear and 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the increasing emphasis on 
the principles of transparency and procedural due process is closely 
linked to the expansion of the WTO mandate and the promotion of 
the “objective of sustainable development.” 
III.EXPANSION OF THE TRANSPARENCY GOAL 
OF THE WTO AND THE HISTORY AND 
EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE X  
The oldest transparency provision of the WTO is contained in 
Article X of the GATT. Since the creation of the WTO, the scope 
and influence of Article X has increased dramatically. Moreover, the 
scope and influence of transparency as a goal of the multilateral 
trading system itself has expanded, through the proliferation of the 
values expressed in Article X and elsewhere in the WTO 
Agreements. 
The text of Article X is identical to the language originally 
proposed by the U.S. State Department in 1946 as Article 15 of the 
International Trade Organization (“ITO”) Charter and, upon failure 
of the ITO, inserted into the GATT as Article X. The wording of 
Article X is clearly derived from the U.S. Administrative Procedure 
 
global levels.” World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2 (Sept. 4, 2002) (Report/CONF.199/20). “The main link 
between trade and sustainable development,” according to the Brundtland 
Commission: 
is the use of non-renewable raw materials to earn foreign exchange. Developing 
countries face the dilemma of having to use commodities as exports, in order to break 
foreign exchange constraints on growth, while also having to minimize damage to the 
environmental resource base supporting this growth. There are other links between 
trade and sustainable development; if protectionism raises barriers against 
manufactured exports, for example, developing nations have less scope for 
diversifying away from traditional commodities. And unsustainable development may 
arise not only from overuse of certain commodities but from manufactured goods that 
are potentially polluting. 
Brundtland Report, supra note 6, ch. 3, ¶ 41. 
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Act (APA), passed in 1946.19 Article X:1 requires “all laws, 
regulations, judicial rulings, and administrative rulings of general 
application [(collectively ‘measures’) to be] published promptly in 
such manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them.”20 Article X:2 prohibits enforcement of such 
measures before publication.21 Article X:3 requires all measures to be 
administered in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” and 
compels Members to establish tribunals or procedures for review of 
the administrative actions relating to customs matters.22  
The creation of the WTO resulted in the proliferation of Article 
X–type provisions concentrating on transparency and procedural due 
process. Some of the other Annex 1A Agreements refer to Article X 
specifically.23 Many of them, such as the Anti-Dumping (AD) Code 
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, have 
their own (additional) transparency and due process requirements, 
however.24 In such cases, the relationship of Article X with the 
 
 19. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006) 
(directing U.S. federal agencies to make certain government-held information 
publicly available through publication in the Federal Register). 
 20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. X:1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 21. It provides: 
No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance 
in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, 
or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on 
imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure 
has been officially published. 
See id. art. X:2 
 22. See id. art. X:3. 
 23. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1868 
U.N.T.S. 279 (“Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of 
general application giving effect to this Agreement shall be published in 
conformity with Article X of GATT 1994 by the country of importation 
concerned.”); Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 397 
(“[L]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application relating to rules of origin are published as if they were subject to and in 
accordance with, the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article X of GATT 1994.”); 
Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (“A Member may 
apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent 
authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously established and made 
public in consonance with Article X of GATT 1994.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM 
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specific due process and transparency provisions of the other Annex 
1A Agreements remains unclear.25 The requirements of Article X 
were made applicable to trade in services and to intellectual property 
rights. Articles III (“Transparency”) and VI (“Domestic Regulation”) 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services replicate the 
language of Article X of the GATT.26 Similarly, Article 63 of the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
establishes publication, notification, and independent judicial review 
requirements similar to those of Article X.27 The Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (“TPRM”) of the WTO is also primarily a 
transparency-related mechanism. TPRM’s explicit objective is to 
increase adherence by WTO members to the rules and disciplines, 
and their commitments, “by [the] achiev[ement of] greater 
transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and 
practices of Members.”28 WTO transparency obligations may extend 
beyond the text of negotiations from the Uruguay Round as 
 
Agreement] (requiring written application and sufficient evidence of a subsidy to 
penalize Members for violations). 
 25. E.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120; 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201; Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 436; SCM Agreement, supra 
note 24. 
 26. Compare General Agreement on Trade in Services art. III, Apr. 15, 1994, 
WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (requiring WTO Members to 
publish all relevant measures including international agreements affecting trade in 
services, annually inform the WTO Council on Trade in Services about any 
changes made to the laws that affect trade in services and the commitments that 
each member has made under that agreement, and establish inquiry points to 
provide information to other WTO members), and id. art. VI (requiring members 
to maintain “judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals . . . [to review] 
administrative decisions affecting trade in services”), with GATT 1994 art. X:3 
(mandating publication of trade regulations and directing contracting parties to 
“maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative 
tribunals . . .”). 
 27. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 63, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(mandating publication of all intellectual property measures and notification of the 
WTO Council for TRIPS as well as allowing member objection to judicial and 
administrative rulings). 
 28. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 
3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 480. 
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additional transparency and good governance provisions are found in 
WTO accession protocols. The most noteworthy example is the 
Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China, which 
requires publication and ready availability for enforcement.29 
The evolution of Article X from a peripheral and subsidiary 
obligation to a provision of fundamental importance to the 
multilateral trading system clearly supports the expansion of the 
transparency mandate of the WTO, from that of the GATT. This 
evolution is also important because it demonstrates the role of the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in fashioning how procedural 
fairness criteria are becoming central to the WTO system, 
particularly as it ventures into “non-economic” areas, such as public 
health, human rights, and the environment.  
From 1947 to 1994, only nine panel decisions involving Article X 
of the GATT were adopted.30 Article X was first mentioned in 1984 
in a claim filed by the United States against Japan for the use of 
 
 29. See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, art. 
2(C)(1), WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (directing China to enforce only those trade-
related laws or regulations that have been published and are readily available to 
other WTO Members). Article 2(C) of the Protocol also requires China to establish 
enquiry points through which WTO Members can request information on the 
measures. See id. art 2(C)(3) (“China shall make available to WTO Members, upon 
request, all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in 
goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange before such measures 
are implemented or enforced.”). 
 30. Report of the Panel, Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain 
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, DS17/R (Oct. 16, 1991), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27 (1992); Report of the Panel, European 
Economic Community—Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, L/6657 
(Mar. 22, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1991); Report of the Panel, 
Canada—Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568 (Sept. 27, 1989), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 68 (1990); Report of the Panel, European 
Economic Community—Restrictions on Imports of Apples—Complaint by the 
United States, L/6513 (June 9, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 135 (1990); 
Report of the Panel, Republic of Korea—Restrictions on Imports of Beef—
Complaint by the United States, L/6503 (May 24, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th 
Supp.) at 268; Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Restrictions 
on Imports of Dessert Apples—Complaint by Chile, L/6491 (Apr. 18, 1989), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93; Japan—Semi-Conductors, supra note 11, at 
116; Japan—Agricultural Products, supra note 11, at 163; Japan—Leather II, 
supra note 11, at 94; see also Report of the Panel, United States—Countervailing 
Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, SCM/94 (Oct. 4, 1989) GATT 
B.I.S.D. (42d Supp.) at 208 (1995). 
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“administrative guidance.”31 In fact, the first three Article X cases 
focused on Japan’s practice of administrative guidance. In all of 
these initial cases, the issue of transparency—specifically, 
publication—was viewed as a subsidiary obligation to the more 
substantive provisions of the GATT found in Articles III and XI:1.  
Under the WTO Agreements, over twenty cases have alleged 
violations of Article X specifically and many other disputes have 
focused on transparency-related obligations set forth in other 
provisions, such as the Anti-Dumping Code. Article X has been 
invoked by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, 
Turkey, and the United States. This diversity demonstrates the 
growing consensus among Members that the expectations for market 
access and the non-discrimination goals of the trading system cannot 
be met without transparency in administration of measures.  
As early as 1997, the Appellate Body stated that Article X “may 
be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance . . . known 
as the principle of transparency that has obvious[] due process 
dimensions.”32 The Appellate Body also has expanded the scope of 
Article X through interpretations of its provisions. It held that 
“measures of general application” covered under Article X:1 include 
even a single administrative ruling applicable to one company or 
shipment if the application establishes a principle which will be 
applicable in future cases. The Appellate Body interpreted the Article 
X:3 requirement of “uniform” application to entail equal treatment of 
importers and exporters under customs procedures, in keeping with 
their expectations, but also in “access to information” and “flow of 
information.” For example, in Dominican Republic—Import and Sale 
of Cigarettes, the WTO panel and the Appellate Body found 
violations of Article X when a survey used as the basis of a tax was 
not published.33 In addition, the Appellate Body made Article X 
 
 31. Cf. Japan—Leather II, supra note 11, ¶ 16 (considering the claim by the 
United States that Japan violated the reasonableness requirements of Article X:3 in 
its administration of leather import quotas as well as in its refusal to publish global 
quotas and lists of license holders). 
 32. Appellate Body Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton 
and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, at 19, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997). 
 33. See Panel Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the 
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶¶ 7.405-06, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 
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applicable to the Agreement on Import Licensing despite the 
Agreement’s silence on Article X and its provision of a separate 
procedure. Finally, in EC—Selected Customs Matters, for the first 
time a dispute centered solely on the provisions of Article X:3(a) and 
no other “substantive” provisions. In the dispute, the United States 
claimed that the European Community’s system of customs 
administration was inconsistent with the Article X:3(a) requirement 
that measures be administered in a “uniform” manner. The Appellate 
Body held that although it was appropriate to challenge a measure 
“as a whole or overall” under Article X, and that the United States 
had appropriately raised that claim on appeal, there was not enough 
facts for the Appellate Body to rule on the claim “as a whole.”34 
Importantly, the Appellate Body undermined the 
substance/procedure distinction, stating that the substance of a 
measure can be challenged under Article X if such substance 
“necessarily leads to” lack of uniform application.35  
In sum, during the past fifteen years, WTO members and the 
Appellate Body have expanded the scope and reach of Article X 
incrementally. Such expansive interpretations have not yet resulted 
in many actual findings of inconsistency with Article X. However, 
there have been some. The scope of Article X is also important as it 
has been invoked by the Appellate Body as being applicable to the 
preamble or chapeau of Article XX. To elaborate on this point, the 
discussion turns to Article XX and, ultimately, the relationship 
between Articles X and XX. 
 
2004) (concluding that the average-price surveys conducted for the determination 
of the tax base for cigarettes were a crucial element of an administrative ruling for 
the purpose of analyzing a violation of the publishing requirement of Article X). 
 34. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Selected Customs 
Matters, ¶¶ 172-73, 201, WT/DS315/AB/R (Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter EC—
Customs] (finding that mere citation to the provisions of a challenged legal 
instrument under Article X:3(a) is insufficient to prove unallowable administration 
of such legal instrument). 
 35. See id. ¶ 201 (“The complainant must discharge the burden of 
substantiating how and why those provisions necessarily lead to impermissible 
administration of the legal instrument of the kind described in Article X:1.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 1022 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
IV.HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE XX 
The general exceptions listed in Article XX of the GATT can be 
traced to the 1927 International Agreement for the Suppression of 
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.36 The same general 
exceptions were subsequently incorporated during negotiations for 
the creation of the ITO.37 As the drafting history of the ITO Charter 
indicates, the drafting of the General Exceptions provision—
ultimately GATT Article XX —was controversial due to the 
proposed scope of the exceptions provided and the “divergence of 
national practices” on the issues addressed.38 From the very 
beginning there was concern that the provision could be used to 
disguise protectionism. That is why the Netherlands and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union proposed the addition of the italicized 
language, below:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures not be applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures:  
 
 36. Compare GATT 1994 art. XX (excluding measures which are necessary for 
the protection of public morals, human, animal, or plant life or health, or those 
needed for the preservation of national treasures with artistic, historic, or 
archaeological value), with Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export 
Prohibitions and Restrictions, Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461, 97 L.N.T.S. 393, 
reprinted in 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 121 (1931) (detailing that Members’ prohibitions 
based on moral or humanitarian grounds and the protection of public health, 
animal and plant life, and national treasures shall not be forbidden by the 
Convention). Article IV provides an exception for, among other things, rules and 
regulations that are “issued on grounds of public health” or “imposed for moral or 
humanitarian reasons . . . .” GATT 1994 art. IV. 
 37. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 
2000) “(We note that, in its analysis, the Panel also referred to the negotiating 
history of the GATT 1947, and particularly to the rejection of a proposal presented 
by India during the negotiations on the International Trade Organization (the 
“ITO”) Charter according to which Members would be permitted to justify, on a 
temporary basis, retaliatory measures under Article XX”).  
 38. See generally The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 
1, 2011) (portraying the ITO draft charter as “ambitious” because it addressed not 
only trade but also rules on national issues such as employment, commodity 
agreements, restrictive business practices, and services). 
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(a) necessary to protect public morals;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or] 
 . . .  
(g) relating to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
 production or consumption.39 
This original amendment to the chapeau language (of what 
eventually became Article XX) has never been changed or amended. 
During the GATT years, the Article XX exceptions contained under 
the subparagraph were construed so strictly that the application of the 
preamble language on such measures was rarely discussed. GATT 
panels did not address Article XX concerns unless a party invoked 
the Article to defend a measure, and in all such cases, the invoking 
party lost.40 At issue in the adopted decisions were subparagraphs (b) 
and (g) of Article XX. As far as subparagraph (g) was concerned, the 
words “relating to” and “in conjunction with” were interpreted to 
 
 39. GATT 1994 art. XX. “Indirect protectionism is an undesirable and 
dangerous phenomenon. Many times stipulations to ‘protect animal or plant life or 
health’ are misused for indirect protection. It is recommended to insert a clause 
which prohibits expressly [the use of] such measures [to] constitute an indirect 
protection . . . .” 1 WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND 
PRACTICE 344 n.655 (1st ed. 2003). 
 40. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, ¶ 5.22, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 
[hereinafter U.S.—Tuna I] (unadopted) (explaining that panels have traditionally 
interpreted Article XX narrowly, mandated that the movant justify the Article’s 
invocation, and not examined Article XX exceptions absent invocation). The 
GATT panel held in U.S.—Tuna I that the Panel did not have an obligation to 
examine Article XX exceptions unless raised by a party to the dispute. See id. Even 
if a party raised an Article XX defense, the traditional analysis of the provisions of 
Article XX by the GATT panels made it difficult, if not impossible, for the party to 
meet its burden of proof. For instance, the panel in U.S.—Tuna I held that a party 
can meet its burden of proof only when the party has: (1) adopted the least-GATT-
inconsistent measure; (2) proven that it exhausted all alternatives before its 
adoption of the measure; and (3) applied the measure in the least-GATT-
inconsistent manner. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4.4, 5.28. The largest hurdle was establishing 
that the measure in question was the least GATT-inconsistent measure available, as 
consideration was not granted to the whether a less GATT-inconsistent measure 
would achieve the level of protection sought by the measure in place. See id. ¶¶ 
5.27-.29. 
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mean “primarily aimed at.” The GATT panels held that even if a 
measure was about an “exhaustible natural resource,” it was not 
primarily aimed at preserving that resource, but rather primarily 
aimed at changing another government’s conservation policies!  
The word “necessary” in subparagraph (b) was interpreted as 
when there “were no alternative measures consistent with the 
[GATT] or less inconsistent with [the GATT].”41 In other words, 
“only if” there was no other alternative would a trade barrier be 
justified under subparagraph (b).42 Because the defending party had 
the burden to show that there was no other alternative, the 
requirement proved to be insurmountable. Other issues continued to 
limit the scope of Article XX, including panel statements seeming to 
question whether measures that extra-territorial application could 
ever be justified under these exceptions.43 As far as the chapeau of 
Article XX language was concerned, during the GATT 1947 years, it 
was referenced as evidence of the fear of the drafters that Article XX 
would be used for protectionist means, and therefore, mandating very 
strict interpretations of what would be a valid measure under Article 
XX. But because the measures invariably failed under the 
requirements of the subparagraph, the requirements of the chapeau 
were not discussed in any great depth. 
The WTO Agreement, as applied by the Appellate Body, changed 
all this, resuscitating Article XX from its previously vegetative state. 
 
 41. Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes, ¶ 75, DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 
200. 
 42. See id. (recognizing the argument by the United States that the 
inconsistency of Thailand’s acts with Article XI:1 should not be considered 
“necessary” because Thailand could attain its public health objectives through 
domestic measures permissible under Article III:4). 
 43. See, e.g., U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 40, ¶ 5.28 (holding that although Article 
XX does not apply to extra-jurisdictional measures, this limitation is overcome by 
the occasional presence of dolphins in U.S. territorial waters). In U.S.—Tuna II, the 
Panel reversed the earlier analysis stating that there is no extra-jurisdictional 
limitation on Article XX-type measures. See Report of the Panel, United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.11, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (unadopted) 
(accepting the argument by the United States that Article XX(g) does not mandate 
the presence of an “exhaustible natural resource” within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the country taking the measure). The Appellate Body had yet to rule on the 
extra-jurisdictional issue previously. See U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 13, ¶ 133 (“We 
do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional 
limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation.”). 
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First, in U.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel, 
stating that the Gasoline Rule at issue was indeed consistent with 
requirements of subparagraph (g) because of its primary aim of 
conservation of natural resources and even-handed treatment vis-à-
vis the domestic industry. It held, therefore, that the measure 
satisfied the requirements of the words “in conjunction with” as well 
as “relating to.” Instead, the Appellate Body moved the analysis 
away from the substance of the measure, and whether the measure on 
its face was consistent with the subparagraph (g) and focused instead 
on the application of the measure and the requirements of the Article 
XX chapeau. In other words, there is no question according to the 
Appellate Body that unilateral measures of this type are within the 
scope of Article XX and that the chapeau of Article XX should not 
be interpreted (as under the GATT 1947) to express merely the fear 
of disguised protectionism through conservation measures, but also 
to impose an additional procedural requirement that limits the trade 
distortive effects of the measure (to the extent possible) given that 
the measure had already been determined to be a legitimate measure 
fitting under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX. Also in 1996, 
in U.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate Body made clear that the meaning 
of Article XX is not what it used to be under the GATT 1947 given 
the preamble of the WTO Agreement and the Decision on Trade and 
Environment.44 The Appellate Body, through its interpretation of the 
WTO preamble and other decisions, changed the status of Article 
XX from an exception narrowly interpreted for fear that it would 
undermine the multilateral trading system to a provision that is 
consistent with, and relevant to, the Appellate Body’s case-by-case 
balancing approach. This approach stems directly from the Body’s 
view of the WTO preamble and the expansion of the WTO mandate 
 
 44. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, at 29-30, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
Nevertheless, “[t]he ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air 
pollution, or more generally, to protect the environment is [not] at issue.” Id. 
Putting that ability at issue, according to the Appellate Body, would: 
ignore the fact that Article XX of the General Agreement [GATT 1994] contains 
provisions designed to permit important state interests—including the protection of 
human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible natural resources to find 
expression . . . . Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Decision on 
Trade and Environment, there is specific acknowledgement to be found about the 
importance of coordinating policies on trade and the environment. 
Id. 
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to include the “objective of sustainable development.” The change in 
attitude towards Article XX from the GATT to the WTO has also 
meant increased emphasis on procedure and a two-step approach to 
application of Article XX. First, a measure is analyzed under an 
Article XX subparagraph for its substantive adequacy and, second, 
after finding that a measure meets the requirements of a 
subparagraph, the measure’s application is weighed, under the 
chapeau of Article XX, to ensure that the measure is not applied in 
an arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory manner or as a disguised 
restriction (although this latter category has yet to be subject to 
clarification or scrutiny from the Appellate Body). This two-step 
analysis originally set forth in U.S.—Gasoline was modified and 
further expanded and clarified in U.S.—Shrimp.45  
Other cases have clarified the scope of the subparagraphs of 
Article XX and have upheld measures that meet the requirements of 
a specific subparagraph. In EC—Asbestos, the Appellate Body found 
a ban on the importation of asbestos and products containing 
asbestos as permitted under Article XX(b) and the chapeau.46 The 
Appellate Body could not find a reasonably available, less trade-
restrictive alternative that would allow the French government to 
achieve its goal of zero health risk associated with asbestos. In other 
words, the analysis of the word “necessary” in Article XX(b) 
requires balancing the legitimate goals of the government with the 
WTO-inconsistent trade restrictions. The more compelling the values 
promoted by the government (for example, human health), the more 
the measure can be trade-restrictive (for example, a blanket import 
ban). This balancing act was explained further in U.S.—Gambling,47 
Korea—Various Measures on Beef,48 Brazil—Retreaded Tyres,49 and 
 
 45. See generally Ala’i, supra note 9, at 1162-69 (providing a full discussion of 
the United States’ import prohibition of certain shimp and shrimp products). 
 46. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 75, 163, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 
12, 2001) (concluding that the measure protected human life or health within the 
meaning of Article XX(b)). 
 47. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 307, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 
2005) (“It is on the basis of this ‘weighing and balancing’ and comparison of 
measures, taking into account the interests or values at stake, that a panel 
determines whether a measure is ‘necessary’ . . . .”). 
 48. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 
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China—Publications and Audiovisual Products.50 In all of these 
cases, the Appellate Body required a balancing act that also took into 
account other reasonably available (less trade-restrictive) 
alternatives.51  
In the context of the chapeau of Article XX, the focus of the 
balancing of interests is on transparency and due process rather than 
the value of the objective pursued and the extent to which there may 
be a less trade-restrictive measure that would achieve an equivalent 
objective. The Appellate Body believes that the subparagraphs of 
Article XX require a balancing of trade liberalization and other, 
potentially overriding public policy considerations.52 In U.S.—
Shrimp, the Appellate Body moved the focus of such balancing from 
the substance of the measure addressed in the subparagraph—that is, 
 
2000) (“[D]etermination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable,’ may 
nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d) involves in 
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors . . . .”). 
 49. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 178, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres] (“[T]o determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ within the 
meaning of Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a panel must consider the relevant 
factors, particularly the importance of interests or values at stake, the extent of the 
contribution to the achievement of the measure’s objective, and its trade 
restrictiveness.”). 
 50. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, ¶ 251, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China—
Publications and Audiovisual Products] (recalling that “the term ‘necessary,’ in 
the abstract, refers to a range of degrees of necessity . . . [which] involves a process 
of weighing and balancing a series of factors that prominently include the 
contribution made by the measure to secure compliance with the law or regulation, 
and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports”). 
 51. E.g., Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 49, ¶ 178. In some of these 
cases, of course, recourse was not made to the chapeau of Article XX because the 
measure itself failed to meet the “substantive” requirements of the subparagraph. 
 52. See China—Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 50, ¶ 310 
(stating that “if a Member chooses to adopt a very restrictive measure, it will have 
to ensure that the measure is carefully designed so that the other elements to be 
taken into account in weighing and balancing the factors relevant to an assessment 
of the ‘necessity’ of the measure will ‘outweigh’ such restrictive effect”); see also 
U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 13, ¶ 159 (noting that the purpose of the chapeau of 
Article XX is to ensure that a Member’s invocation of an Article XX exception 
does not “cancel out the [rights of other Members under a substantive provision of 
the GATT 1994] and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and 
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement”). 
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whether the measure relates to “preservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource” and is primarily aimed at rendering effective 
“restrictions on domestic production or consumption”—to the 
application of the measure, including the procedural aspects of a 
measure (such as transparency-related criteria), addressed in the 
chapeau of Article XX. Significantly, the Appellate Body in U.S.—
Shrimp acknowledged the importance of due process by making 
reference to Article X as follows:  
It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain 
minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the 
administration of trade regulations which, in our view, are not met here. 
The non-transparent and ex–parte nature of the internal governmental 
procedures applied by the competent officials . . . throughout the 
certification processes . . . are all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of 
Article X:3 of GATT 1994.53 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: WHERE DO 
WE GO FROM HERE?  
The creation of the WTO has brought Articles X and XX from the 
periphery of GATT jurisprudence to the center of WTO 
jurisprudence. The evolution of the relationship between these two 
provisions must be understood within the context of the preamble to 
the WTO Agreement and the expansion of the trade mandate, which 
has resulted in the erosion of the economic/non-economic distinction 
that had dominated the post-World War II economic order. The 
WTO preamble, as interpreted by the Appellate Body, requires 
weighing and balancing trade-liberalization interests against the 
equally important objective of sustainable development. The result of 
such balancing, as may be expected, is an emphasis on procedural 
transparency and the fairness of the mechanisms in place, rather than 
a weighing of the substantive values at issue—for example, 
conservation of an endangered species versus the “costs” associated 
with restricting trade in violation of the WTO rules.  
WTO panels and the Appellate Body cannot return to the simpler 
days of the GATT 1947 when they could rely on an ideological bias 
for the free market. That time is over. To retain its relevance and 
legitimacy, the WTO must promote free trade without undermining 
 
 53. U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 13, ¶ 183. 
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other important and increasingly universal values, such as protection 
and preservation of the environment, worker and human rights, and 
protection of public health and this will be done by turning towards 
transparency and predictability of a legal regime.  
In the coming decades, the WTO will continue to tackle cutting-
edge issues, such as climate change, renewable energy, and access to 
clean water or medicine, largely because there are no other global 
forums where countries can address conflicts between national 
regulatory schemes. Unfortunately, the multilateral trade negotiations 
are at an impasse as reflected by the failure of the Doha round of 
trade negotiations and the increasing number of new issues that are 
not adequately by the Doha agenda.   
At the same time, the global economic downturn particularly in 
the United States and European Union, raise the possibility of 
increased protectionism. No other global forum has been able to 
unite humankind in addressing its common problems. It may well be 
however that that Bretton Woods System is no longer functioning 
appropriately to address global challenges. In the absence of other 
global forum, it is inevitable that the WTO members will continue to 
turn to the WTO Dispute Settlement System (the WTO panels and, 
ultimately, the Appellate Body) to address contentious issues and 
policies on a case by case basis. Will the Appellate Body be able to 
address such issues without undermining itself? The answer to this 
question is unclear.  If the past is any indication, the future will see 
an increasing emphasis on transparency and due process by the 
Appellate Body and the WTO panels.  
Case-specific balancing of interests will be a very difficult task 
requiring the WTO to focus on the legitimacy of the process at both 
the national and the WTO level. As such, the WTO increasingly will 
focus on: (1) internal transparency of its own decision-making and 
(2) domestic transparency and predictability in the application of 
measures that are trade-restrictive or discriminatory, but that 
nevertheless promote values important to sustainable development. 
Article X and Article XX values are inextricably linked for the 
foreseeable future. The evolution in interpretation and application of 
these two provisions and the values they represent will be crucial to 
the future of the WTO, its legitimacy, and its role in promoting 
sustainable development.  
